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WHICH AXIOMS OF SET THEORY ARE
INTRINSICALLY JUSTIFIED?
RUPERT M
c
CALLUM
Abstract. We recently formulated a new large-cardinal axiom of
strength intermediate between a totally indescribable cardinal and
an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal, positing the existence of what we called an
“extremely reflective cardinal”, and we showed that the property
of being extremely reflective was in fact equivalent to the property
of being remarkable, and we sought to argue that this axiom should
be seen as intrinsically justified. This built on related earlier work
in which the notion of an α-reflective cardinal was formulated.
Then Welch and Roberts put forward a family of reflection prin-
ciples, Welch’s principle implying the existence of a proper class
of Shelah cardinals and provably consistent relative to a super-
strong cardinal, and Roberts’ principle implying the existence of a
proper class of 1-extendible cardinals and provably consistent rela-
tive to a 2-extendible cardinal. Roberts tentatively argued that his
principle should be seen as intrinsically justified (at least on the
assumption that a weaker form of reflection involving reflection
of second-order formulas with a second-order parameter should be
seen as intrinsically justified). This work overlapped with previous
work of Victoria Marshall’s on reflection principles. We analyze
the relationship between reflection principles equivalent to those
studied in my earlier work and stronger but similar reflection prin-
ciples which are natural extensions of those of Welch and Roberts.
We also show how a natural strengthening of Roberts’ reflection
principle yields the existence of supercompact cardinals, and in
the process solve a question which Marshall left open, of whether
her theory B0(V0) is strong enough to imply the existence of su-
percompact cardinals. We also manage to resolve negatively her
question of whether her theory B1(V0) implies the existence of a
huge cardinal.
1. Introduction
In speaking of justifications for candidates for new axioms for set
theory to be added to the ZFC axioms, philosophers of set theory draw
a distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” justifications. This
distinction has its origins in remarks made by Kurt Go¨del in his famous
essay about the continuum problem [4]. There he wrote ‘First of all,
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the axioms of set theory by no means form a system closed in itself, but,
quite on the contrary, the very concept of set on which they are based
suggests their extension by new axioms which assert the existence of
still further iterations of the operation “set of”. These axioms can be
formulated also as propositions asserting the existence of very great
cardinal numbers (i.e., of sets having these cardinal numbers). The
simplest of these strong “axioms of infinity” asserts the existence of
inaccessible numbers (in the weaker or stronger sense) > ℵ0. The latter
axiom, roughly speaking, means nothing else but that the totality of
sets obtainable by use of the procedures of formation of sets expressed
in the other axioms forms again a set (and, therefore, a new basis for
further applications of these procedures). Other axioms of infinity have
first been formulated by P. Mahlo. These axioms show clearly, not only
that the axiomatic system of set theory as used today is incomplete, but
also that it can be supplemented without arbitrariness by new axioms
which only unfold the content of the concept of set explained above.’ In
a footnote he wrote ‘... some propositions have been formulated which,
if consistent, are extremely strong axioms of infinity of an entirely
new kind... That these axioms are implied by the general concept of
set in the same sense as Mahlo’s has not been made clear yet.’ Here
he was referring to axioms asserting the existence of weakly compact,
measurable, or strongly compact cardinals.
Thus, he held the view that axioms asserting the existence of inac-
cessible or Mahlo cardinals were “intrinsically justified” in the sense of
merely unfolding the content of the conception of set, whereas it was
not clear whether this was the case for axioms asserting the existence
of weakly compact, measurable, or strongly compact cardinals, and at
the time of his writing the essay the only known justifications for these
axioms were “extrinsic”. An extrinsic justification for a candidate for
a new axiom is based on something other than the idea that the axiom
merely unfolds the content of the conception of set, such as for example
the axiom having desirable or verifiable consequences. Go¨del made the
following remarks about this kind of justification: ‘Secondly, however,
even disregarding the intrinsic necessity of some new axiom, and even
in case it has no intrinsic necessity at all, a probable decision about
its truth is possible also in another way, namely, inductively by study-
ing its “success”. Success here means fruitfulness in consequences, in
particular in “verifiable” consequences, i.e., consequences demonstrable
without the new axiom, whose proofs with the help of the new axiom,
however, are considerably simpler and easier to discover, and make it
possible to contract into one proof many different proofs... There might
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exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable consequences, shedding so
much light upon a whole field, and yielding such powerful methods for
solving problems (and even solving them constructively, as far as that
is possible) that, no matter whether or not they are intrinsically neces-
sary, they would have to be accepted at least in the same sense as any
well-established physical theory.’
These remarks were the origin of the distinction between “intrinsic”
and “extrinsic” justifications which is still discussed by philosophers of
set theory today.
In a recent paper [7] I introduced the notion of an “extremely re-
flective cardinal”, and proved that the property of being extremely
reflective was in fact equivalent to the property of being remarkable.
For that reason I should say “remarkable cardinal” from now on rather
than “extremely reflective cardinal”. I made a few remarks about in-
trinsic justifications for large-cardinal axioms in general, influenced by
Tait’s ideas in [10], supporting Go¨del’s view that axioms asserting the
existence of inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals are indeed intrinsically
justified, in the sense described above. Then I used these ideas to
motivate the view that belief in the existence of a remarkable cardi-
nal was also intrinsically justified. This work built on related work
on the topic of intrinsically justified reflection principles by Tait [10]
and Koellner [5]. The challenge of formulating an intrinsically justified
reflection principle with at least as much consistency strength as an
ω-Erdo˝s cardinal was made by Peter Koellner in [5]. Roberts recently
wrote a very interesting paper [2] in response to this challenge, building
on previous similar work of Welch in [1] but avoiding explicit reference
to elementary embeddings.
To explain the reflection principle which Roberts formulates in his
paper, let us begin by explaining the reflection principle that he calls R2.
This is an axiom schema in the second-order language of set theory.
For each formula φ(x1, x2, . . . xm, X1, X2, . . .Xn) in the second-order
language of set theory, there is an axiom asserting that if φ holds,
then there exists an ordinal α such that x1, x2, . . . xm ∈ Vα, and a
“set-sized” family of classes which contains the classes X1, X2, . . .Xn,
which is itself coded for by a single class, and which is standard for Vα
in the sense that every subset X ⊆ Vα is such that some class in the
family has intersection with Vα equal to X , such that the formula φ
still holds when the first-order variables are relativised to Vα and the
second-order variables are relativised to the set-sized family of classes.
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This completes the description of the axiom schema R2. Then Roberts
extends the axiom schema as follows. He extends the underlying lan-
guage so as to include a satisfaction predicate for the second-order
language of set theory, and then he extends the axiom schema so as to
also include an axiom of the kind described for every formula in this
extended language, calling this new axiom schema RS. Then he denotes
by ZFC2S the result of extending ZFC2 – being the same as ZFC except
for having Separation and Replacement as single second-order axioms
and also having an axiom schema of class comprehension for every for-
mula in the second-order language of set theory – by adding the usual
Tarskian axioms for the satisfaction predicate and extending the class
comprehension axiom schema to include axioms involving formulas in
the extended language. Then he proceeds to investigate the theory
ZFC2S + RS. This completes the description of the reflection princi-
ple which Roberts considers. He shows that the theory ZFC2S + RS
proves the existence of a proper class of 1-extendible cardinals and is
consistent relative to a 2-extendible cardinal. The reflection principle
suggested by Welch in [1] is similar but slightly weaker, and makes use
of an elementary embedding rather than a “reflecting structure”.
In Section 2 I will describe the ideas about intrinsic justification
which originally led me to think that the existence of remarkable car-
dinals was intrinsically justified. Then in Section 3 I will analyze the
relationship between the reflection principles of [6] and [7] with those
of [1], [2] and [14], and consider the philosophical question whether
there can be any principled grounds for accepting the former but not
the latter. I will also discuss how a natural extension of the reflection
principle put forward by Roberts is equivalent to the existence of a
supercompact cardinal. In Section 4 I make some concluding remarks.
2. Intrinsic justifications for small large cardinals
It is instructive to begin by considering a challenge posed by Schindler
in [8] to the idea that any large cardinals are intrinsically justified. In
that paper Schindler considers a class theory BL1 which he claims to
embody the weakest reflection principle schema that leads to the exis-
tence of large cardinals. He shows that it proves ∆1,NBG1 -comprehension
but that this comprehension schema is false for the predicative classes.
He concludes that we then face the dilemma between accepting the ex-
istence of non-predicative classes (for which he believes there is no good
justification), or concluding that there is not sufficient justification for
believing in the existence of large cardinals, at least in V (which he
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finds to be an unsatisfying view). Let us now see how we can respond
to this argument based on ideas of Tait in [10].
In [10] Tait begins by quoting Cantor in [12] as saying, with reference
to the totality Ω of transfinite ordinal numbers, ‘If the initial segment
Σ of Ω is a set, then it has a least strict upper bound S(Σ) ∈ Ω.’
It is obviously not consistent for every initial segment of Ω to be a
set, since Ω itself cannot be a set. So some criterion must be given
for when an initial segment is a set. Later Cantor attempted to solve
this problem by invoking the notion of a ‘consistent multiplicity’, but
as Tait says ‘that is just naming the problem, not solving it.’ Tait
proposes a modified version of Cantor’s principle which Peter Koellner
later in [5] called the Relativised Cantorian Principle, which says ‘If
the initial segment Σ of ΩC satisfies the condition C, then it has a
least strict upper bound S(Σ) ∈ ΩC .’ With an appropriate choice of
the condition C, which Tait calls an ‘existence condition’, we can in
this way determine an initial segment ΩC of the totality of transfinite
ordinal numbers Ω. Tait writes ‘In this way, we are led to a hierarchy of
more and more inclusive existence conditions, each of which can replace
the condition “is a set” in Cantor’s definition and so yields an initial
segment of the transfinite numbers, but none of which yields “all the
numbers”.’ He calls this the ‘bottom-up’ conception.
We can articulate the idea that this is part of the iterative conception
of set as follows. We view ourselves as building up levels Vα of the
universe from below. If, at any given stage of the process, we have
built up a level Vα which satisfies a certain condition which we take
to be a “warrant” for concluding that it cannot be all of V , then we
take ourselves to be justified in going one level further. We also take
ourselves to be justified in taking limits at limit ordinals. Furthermore,
given any circumscribed set of processes for building up new levels of
the universe in this way, we take ourselves to be justified in positing
a closure point for all these processes which is still only a set. In this
way we can motivate the proposition that a level satisfying a certain
amount of reflection should exist, (that is, properties of the level are
reflected to a lower level), by positing that when a level fails to satisfy
that form of reflection then that is warrant for going one level further.
This can be used to motivate the existence of a level satisfying a first-
order reflection schema, which is equivalent, given the axioms of ZF
other than Infinity and Replacement, to all of ZF. But we can also take
ourselves to be justified in positing reflection schemas for formulas in
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higher-order languages, because at each stage of the process of building
up the levels from below, we know that the level we have built up so far
is only a set and so we are justified in speaking of properties of this level
which can only be formulated in higher-order languages. Of course, this
knowledge that the level we have built up so far is only a set cannot
by itself be taken to be warrant for going one level further, otherwise
the principles we have enunciated so far would lead to inconsistency.
Rather, there must be some condition such that, if the level built up
so far satisfies it, then that is a warrant for concluding that it cannot
be all of V and so going one level further. This can be based on the
idea that V should not be “describable” and so any witness to the
“describability” of this level can be taken as a warrant for going one
level further. This line of thought can be used to motivate higher-order
reflection principles (or at least levels of the universe satisfying higher-
order reflection principles) without any need to be committed to the
existence of non-predicative proper classes. That is, these ideas of Tait
provide us with a way of responding to Schindler’s critique of the view
that belief in large cardinals in justified.
If we accept that higher-order reflection principles can be motivated
in this way, the question then arises which reflection principles should
be accepted. One naive idea might be as follows. Let Lω
∈
be the ωth-
order language of set theory, and suppose we are considering a formula
φ with free variables x1, x2, . . . xm1 , X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 , . . .X
(2)
m2 , X
(3)
1 , X
(3)
2 , . . .
X
(3)
m3 , . . .X
(k)
1 , X
(k)
2 , . . .X
(k)
mk ,, where the variables denoted by lower-case
letters are first-order variables, and for variables denoted by upper-
case letters superscripts indicate the order of the variables, and an
mth-order variable ranges over Pm−1(D) where D is the domain of
discourse. Suppose that the domain of discourse D is equal to Vκ for
some ordinal κ. If X(2) ∈ P(Vκ), let X
(2),α := X(2) ∩Vα for all ordinals
α < κ, and then inductively define X(k),α = {X(k−1),α | X(k−1) ∈ X(k)}
for all ordinals α < κ and all X(k) ∈ Pk−1(Vκ). Then we can posit
that there should be a level Vκ with the property that if the formula φ
is true in Vκ for a certain assignment of values to the variables, then
there should be some ordinal α < κ such that the relativisation of φ
to Vα holds for an assignment of values to the variables such that if a
variable has X(j) assigned to it under the first assignment then it will
haveX(j),α as defined above assigned to it under the second assignment.
By the relativisation of φ to Vα we mean the result of relativising the
first-order quantifiers to Vα, the second-order quantifiers to Vα+1, and
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so on. This is a naive form of reflection which one might naturally
posit.
If one makes the restriction that the free variables should be no higher
than second-order then this is consistent (relative to the consistency
of a totally indescribable cardinal), but if one allows parameters of
third order or higher then this is inconsistent, as was first observed
by Reinhardt in [13]. This can be seen as follows, using an argument
presented by Tait in [10]. Let φ be a formula with exactly one free third-
order variable X(3) asserting that every element of X(3) is a bounded
set of ordinals. Then if we assign to the variable X(3) the set {{α |
α < β} | β < κ}, then φ(X(3)) will be true in Vκ but we will not
have φα(X(3),α) for any α < κ, where φα denotes the relativisation of
φ to Vα. Thus the reflection principle described is inconsistent if we
allow parameters of third order or higher. So if one wants to accept
the reflection principle in the case of parameters no higher than second
order, one must identify principled reasons why one should not also
accept it for parameters of third order or higher.
Let us consider what Tait writes in [10] about this question.
‘One plausible way to think about the difference between reflecting
φ(A) when A is second-order and when it is of higher-order is that,
in the former case, reflection is asserting that, if φ(A) holds in the
structure 〈R(κ),∈, A〉, then it holds in the substructure 〈R(β),∈, Aβ〉
for some β < κ . . . But, when A is higher-order, say of third-order this
is no longer so. Now we are considering the structure 〈R(κ), R(κ+1),
∈, A〉 and 〈R(β), R(β+1),∈, Aβ〉. But, the latter is not a substructure
of the former, that is the ‘inclusion map’ of the latter structure into the
former is no longer single-valued: for subclasses X and Y of R(κ), X 6=
Y does not imply Xβ 6= Y β. Likewise for X ∈ R(κ + 1), X /∈ A does
not imply Xβ /∈ Aβ. For this reason, the formulas that we can expect
to be preserved in passing from the former structure to the latter must
be suitably restricted and, in particular, should not contain the relation
/∈ between second- and third-order objects or the relation 6= between
second-order objects.’
He then uses these ideas to motivate the following family of reflection
principles.
Definition 2.1. A formula in the ωth-order language of set theory is
positive iff it is built up by means of the operations ∨, ∧, ∀, ∃ from
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atoms of the form x = y, x 6= y, x ∈ y, x /∈ y, x ∈ Y (2), x /∈ Y (2) and
X(m) = X ′(m) and X(m) ∈ Y (m+1), where m ≥ 2.
Definition 2.2. Suppose that A is a variable of order at most 2. Define
An× = {〈n, x〉 | x ∈ A} and A/n = {x | 〈n, x〉 ∈ A}. In the case where
B is a variable of order greater than 2, define, using induction on the
order of B, Bn× := {An× | A ∈ B} and B/n := {A/n | A ∈ B}.
Given an n-tuple of variables of order m, (X
(m)
0 , X
(m)
1 , . . .X
(m)
n−1), call
the operator S which sends this n-tuple to S(X
(m)
0 , X
(m)
1 , . . .X
(m)
n−1) :=⋃n−1
i=0 (X
(m)
i )i× a contracting operator, and call an operator of the form
X 7→ X/n a de-contracting operator. Call a formula φ in the ωth-order
language of set theory positive in the extended sense if it is equivalent
to a formula, which has no quantified variables of order higher than
first-order, and is positive, except that it may include contracting and
de-contracting operators.
Definition 2.3. For 0 < n < ω, Γ
(2)
n is the class of formulas
∀X
(2)
1 ∃Y
(k1)
1 · · · ∀X
(2)
n ∃Y
(kn)
n φ(X
(2)
1 , Y
(k1)
1 , . . . , X
(2)
n , Y
(kn)
n , A
(l1), . . . A(ln′ ))
where φ is positive in the extended sense and k1, . . . kn, l1, . . . ln′ are
natural numbers which are greater than or equal to 2.
Definition 2.4. We say that Vκ satisfies Γ
(2)
n -reflection if, for all φ ∈
Γ
(2)
n , if
Vκ |= φ(A
(m1), A(m2), . . . A(mp)) then Vκ |= φ
δ(A(m1),δ, A(m2),δ, . . . A(mp),δ)
for some δ < κ, where φδ denotes the relativisation of φ in the manner
described previously.
Peter Koellner established in [5] that these reflection principles are
consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. In [10] Tait proposes to
define Γ
(m)
n in the same way as the class of formulas Γ
(2)
n , except that
universal quantifiers of order ≤ m are permitted. Koellner shows in [5]
that this form of reflection is inconsistent when m > 2.
Now I shall describe a family of reflection principles which are consis-
tent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal and which yield all of the reflection
principles of Tait considered so far not known to be inconsistent. I shall
describe a naive version of it first which is inconsistent and then show
how to modify it so as to make it consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s
cardinal.
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Consider a formula φ in the ωth-order language of set theory with free
variables x1, x2, . . . xm1 , X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 , . . .X
(2)
m2 , . . .X
(k)
1 , X
(k)
2 , . . .X
(k)
mk and sup-
pose that φ holds in Vκ for a certain assignment of values to the free
variables. The first idea we try is simply to avoid re-interpreting the
higher-order variables when we reflect downwards. That is, we posit
that there should be an α < κ with x1, x2, . . . xm1 ∈ Vα, such that φ
holds with all of the free variables interpreted the same way as before,
first-order variables ranging over Vα and kth-order variables ranging
over Pk−1(Vκ) for k ≥ 2. This is a natural form of reflection to consider
as an alterative to the first family of reflection principles we considered
that was shown to be inconsistent. However, this form of reflection is
also unfortunately inconsistent. To see this, consider the sentence φ
given by ∀X∀Y (X 6= Y =⇒ ∃x((x ∈ X ∧x /∈ Y )∨ (x /∈ X ∧x ∈ Y ))),
where X and Y are second-order variables. This formula clearly gives
a counter-example to our reflection principle for any level Vκ.
We can diagnose the root of this problem as arising from the fact
that we introduced an existential quantifier for a first-order variable
within the scope of a higher-order quantifier. This means that when we
“Skolemize” the formula the existentially quantified first-order variable
becomes a Skolem function of a tuple of variables including higher-
order variables, and now the fact that the number of possible val-
ues for a higher-order variable is large may mean that we cannot
have closure under the Skolem functions for any reflecting structure
(Vα, Vκ+1, Vκ+2, . . .) for any α < κ. If we modify the reflection prin-
ciple so as only to apply to formulas in which unbounded existential
quantifiers for first-order variables do not appear within the scope of
a higher-order quantifier (but existential quantifiers bound by a first-
order variable are allowed), then the resulting reflection principle be-
comes consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. In fact a level Vκ
satisfies this form of reflection if and only if κ is ω-refelctive in the
sense defined in [6], and when this is so then Vκ satisfies Γ
(2)
n -reflection
for all n ∈ ω.
It is natural to posit this as the correct modification of the incon-
sistent reflection principle considered earlier. An ω-reflective cardinal
is totally ineffable and every totally ineffable cardinal is a stationary
limit of totally indescribable cardinals, so we obtain a justification for
the form of reflection considered earlier in the case of parameters no
higher than second order. As discussed in [7] a natural development
of this line of thought motivates the idea that a remarkable cardinal is
also intrinsically justified.
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This completes our discussion of intrinsic justifications for small large
cardinals. All cardinals considered so far are indeed small in the sense
of being consistent relative to an ω-Erdo˝s cardinal. The time has now
come to consider the reflection principles of [2] and [14].
3. The Reflection Principles of Welch, Roberts and
Marshall
Clearly the reflection principle that I described in the previous sec-
tion is quite similar to Roberts’ reflection principle. If we accept the
former as intrinsically justified, then are there any principled reasons
to entertain doubts about the latter being intrinsically justified? One
possible consideration is the following. If Vκ is a level of the uni-
verse which fails to satisfy the reflection principle that I described in
the previous section, as witnessed by some formula φ with parame-
ters x1, x2, . . . xm1 , X
(2)
1 , X
(2)
2 , . . .X
(2)
m2 , . . . X
(k)
1 , X
(k)
2 , . . .X
(k)
mk , then the
structure (Vκ, Vκ+1, Vκ+2, . . .) is describable relative to these parame-
ters as the first element in a transfinite well-ordered sequence of struc-
tures satisfying the formula φ in question relative to the parameters in
question, where the well-ordering is itself independent of any parame-
ters. In this situation there is canonical well-ordering of the family of
structures in question. However, when considering Roberts’ principle,
there is no canonical well-ordering of the family of possible reflecting
structures, and so one may resist the idea that failure of the reflection
principle at a particular level shows that that level is “describable”
relative to the parameters. Perhaps this might constitute a principled
reason for accepting the reflection principle described in the previous
section as intrinsically justified, but refusing to accept Roberts’ reflec-
tion principle as intrinsically justified.
A possible response is the following. We could take some well-
ordering of the family of possible reflecting structures, with the full
structure as its last element, as an additional parameter, and then say
that the level Vκ in question which failed to satisfy the reflection princi-
ple is “describable” with respect to this larger set of parameters. Then
one might suggest that now there is just as good motivation for taking
this as a “warrant” for going one level further as in the case of the
reflection principle discussed in the previous section. This might con-
vince one to accept Roberts’ principle as intrinsically justified after all,
but on the other hand the well-ordering is now defined in terms of one
of the parameters, which might be seen as problematic. However, using
the result that every element of V occurs in a set generic extension of
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HOD, we get that every Vκ does in fact have a canonical well-ordering,
and so in this way that objection can be overcome.
To further illuminate the discussion of the problem, it will be useful
to analyze further what kinds of comparisons can be made between the
reflection principle discussed in the previous section and the reflection
principle of Roberts. But, before doing so, we shall introduce the re-
flection principles discussed by Marshall in [14] and discuss how they
are related to the reflection principle of Roberts (and natural general-
izations of it).
So let us now describe Marshall’s family of theories Bn indexed by the
positive integers n, following her exposition in [14]. The first theory in
the sequence, B1, was formulated by Bernays and is presented in [16].
We shall first describe the theory B1 and then proceed to describe
Marshall’s generalizations Bn for integers n > 1.
The theory B1 is a theory in the first-order language of set theory.
The objects of the domain of discourse are called classes and a class is
said to be a set if and only if it is a member of some class, otherwise it
is said to be a proper class. Now we shall describe the axioms of the
theory B1.
(A1) Extensionality. ∀x(x ∈ A ≡ x ∈ B) =⇒ A = B.
(A2) Class specification. Suppose that φ is a formula and that A is
not free in φ. Then
∃A∀x(x ∈ A ≡ φ(x) ∧ x is a set).
(A3) Subsets. A is a set ∧ B ⊆ A =⇒ B is a set.
(A4) Reflection principle. Suppose that φ(x) is a formula. Then
φ(A) =⇒ ∃u(u is a transitive set ∧ φPu(A ∩ u)).
(A5) Foundation. ∃x(x ∈ A) =⇒ ∃x(x ∈ A ∧ ∀z(z /∈ x ∨ z /∈ A)).
(A6) Choice for sets. ∀x((x is a set ∧ ∀y∀y′((y ∈ x ∧ y′ ∈ x ∧ y 6=
y′) =⇒ y ∩ y′ = ∅)) =⇒ ∃x′(∀y(y ∈ x =⇒ ∃!z(z ∈ y ∧ z ∈ x′)))).
This completes the description of the axioms of the theory B1. The
natural models of B1 are those sets of the form Vα+1 for some ordinal α
such that (Vα+1,∈) is a model for the theory B1. The ordinals α such
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that Vα+1 is a natural model of B1 are precisely the Π
1
∞
-indescribable
cardinals, thus the existence of a Π1
∞
-indescribable cardinal is a suffi-
cient assumption on which to prove that B1 is consistent. The theory
B1 in turn implies the relativization of all the axioms of ZFC to the
class of sets and also the existence of a proper class of Π1n-indescribable
cardinals for each positive integer n. Let us now see how Marshall gen-
eralized this to a sequence of stronger theories. We shall first describe
the theory B2 and then proceed to describe the theories Bn for n > 2.
The theory B2 is a theory in the first-order language of set theory.
The objects of the domain of discourse are called 2-classes, an object
is said to be a class if and only if it is a member of some 2-class, and
an object is said to be a set if and only if it is a member of some class.
The class of all sets (whose existence and uniqueness will follow from
the axioms soon to be presented) is denoted by V0, and the 2-class of
all classes is denoted by V1.
The first axiom for the theory is the axiom of 2-class specification.
(A1) Suppose that φ is a formula and A is not free in φ. Then
∃A∀x(x ∈ A ≡ φ(x) ∧ x is a class).
Next we have extensionality for 2-classes.
(A2) ∀x(x ∈ A ≡ x ∈ B) =⇒ A = B.
We write STC(v) to abbreviate a formula saying that v is transitive,
and every sub-2-class x of any element y of v is also an element of v.
If A and u are 2-classes, Au denotes A∩u if A is a class, and denotes
{xu | x ∈ A∩u} if A is not a class. φu denotes the relativization of the
formula φ to u.
If x and y are two classes, then the ordered pair [x, y] of the classes
x and y is defined to be x × {0} ∪ y × {1}. The notation A(u) is an
abbreviation for u∩V0 ∈ V0∧STC(u∩V0)∧∀x∀y(x, y ∈ u =⇒ [x, y] ∈
u). Then our reflection principle is given by
(A3) If φ(x) is a formula, then
φ(A) =⇒ ∃u(A(u) ∧ φPP(u∩V0)(Au)).
Finally we take as axioms the axiom of foundation and the axiom of
choice for sets as in the theory B1, noting that the interpretation of the
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abbreviation “x is a set” is now different. This completes the descrip-
tion of the theory B2. Given any theorem φ of B1, the relativization of
φ to V1 is a theorem of B2, as shown in [14]. Marshall also shows in [14]
that B2 proves that the class of 1-extendible cardinals is a stationary
subclass of the class of ordinals, and that if κ is 2-extendible or iκ+1-
supercompact, then Vκ+2 is a natural model of B2. Before proceeding
to give the description of the theories Bn with n > 2, let us pause
to discuss the relationship between B2 and a natural generalization of
Roberts’ theory ZFC2S+RS, and also to characterize the natural mod-
els of B2 and related theories, thereby answering a question asked by
Marshall in [14].
There is an obvious extension of Roberts’ theory ZFC2S + RS to a
theory in the third-order language of set theory ZFC3+ R3. And there
is an obvious interpretation of the third-order language of set theory in
the first-order language of set theory where the domain of discourse of
the variables in the latter language is understood to be the 2-classes.
It is easy to see that the image of the theory ZFC3 + R3 under this
interpretation is equivalent to the theory B2. Similar relationships
could be found between other natural extensions of Roberts’ theory
and the theories Bn for integers n > 2 to be defined later. Let us
characterize the natural models of B2. Roberts shows in [2] that if Vκ+2
is a natural model of B2 then κ is a limit of a 1-extendible chain, that is,
a subset S ⊆ κ cofinal in κ such that if α ∈ S, α < β, and β ∈ S ∪{κ},
then α is 1-extendible to β, that is, there is an elementary embedding
j : Vα+1 ≺ Vβ+1 with critical point α and j(α) = β. Given any positive
integer n there is a clear corresponding notion of a Π2n-extendible chain,
and Roberts’ result easily generalizes to show that Vκ+2 is a natural
model of B2 if and only if κ is a limit of a Π
2
n-extendible chain for all
positive integers n. There is a similar characterization of the natural
models of ZFC2S + RS in which Vα+2 is replaced with L1(Vα+1) and
one uses the hierarchy of complexity classes of formulas relativized to
L1(Vα+1). Let us now return to the task of defining the theories Bn for
integers n > 2.
The theory Bn for an integer n > 2 is a theory in the first-order
language of set theory where the domain of discourse is taken to be the
n-classes, where classes are collections of sets, 2-classes are collections
of classes, 3-classes are collections of 2-classes, and so on. The axioms
of extensionality and class specification are as before, and there is an
obvious definition of V0, the collection of sets, V1, the collection of
classes, and Vk, the collection of k-classes for an integer k such that
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2 ≤ k ≤ n. For arbitrary n-classes A and u, we define Au = A ∩ u if
A ∈ V1 and then by ∈-induction we define A
u = {xu | x ∈ A ∩ u} for
A /∈ V1. Then our reflection principle is: For each formula φ(x), we
have
φ(A) =⇒ ∃u(A(u) ∧ φP
n(V0∩u)(Au)).
Then we have the axiom of foundation and the axiom of choice for
sets as before. This completes the definition of the theory Bn, which is
equivalent to natural extensions of Roberts’ theory ZFC2S + RS in the
same way as before.
Suppose that we consider an extension of Roberts’ theory to a theory
in the ωth-order language of set theory which we might label ZFCω+Rω,
and suppose that we drop the requirement that the reflecting structure
must be “set-sized”, but keep the requirement that it must be “stan-
dard”. The natural models of this theory are of the form Vκ+ω where
κ is a limit of an n-extendible chain for each positive integer n. We
could also easily formulate an essentially equivalent theory in the first-
order language of set theory along the lines outlined by Marshall, where
now the role of what corresponds to what we previously called the “re-
flecting structure” is no longer to serve as the reflecting structure but
simply to guide the reflection of the parameter.
On the other hand, I might modify the reflection principle in the ωth-
order language of set theory described in Section 2, so that the reflect-
ing structure is allowed to be any structure of the form 〈Vα, X1, X2, . . .〉
where α < κ andXi ⊆ Vκ+i for i ∈ ω and i > 0, and eachXi is standard
for Vα in the sense that the image under the transitive collapsing map
contains all of Vα+i. That is, the permitted reflecting structures are
exactly the same as those allowed in the previously described modifica-
tion of Roberts’ theory. The resulting theory is in fact equivalent to the
theory originally described in Section 2, and the natural models of my
theory are still the ω-reflective cardinals. The only difference between
my theory and the modification of Roberts’ theory is that my theory
does not allow reflection of formulas which have unbounded existential
quantification of first-order variables within the scope of a quantifier
for a higher-order variable. However, dropping that requirement on the
formulas is only consistent if we allow a wide range of possible reflecting
structures.
This indicates the kind of comparison that can be made between
the reflection principles that give rise to ω-reflective cardinals, and the
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much stronger reflection principles considered by Roberts and Marshall
which give rise to n-extendible cardinals for every positive integer n.
In [7] we showed how the property of being a remarkable cardinal could
be seen as a reflection principle. As discussed in more detail below, if
we construct a reflection principle which is to the reflection principle
for the remarkable cardinals as this just mentioned stronger reflection
principle is to the ω-reflective cardinals, then we obtain a large-cardinal
property equivalent to supercompactness.
In this way we can see two different possible notions of intrinsic
justification, one extending all the way up to a remarkable cardinal,
and one extending all the way up to a supercompact cardinal.
As mentioned in the discussion to which I referred just now, of the
connection between the notion of a remarkable cardinal and the no-
tion of a supercompact cardinal, it is natural to generalise, along a
line of thought similar to that which yielded the generalization from
ω-reflective cardinals to the reflection principle for remarkable cardi-
nals, from Roberts’ reflection principle to a stronger reflection principle
which yields the existence of supercompact cardinals. Given a level Vκ,
we can consider structures of the form (Vκ, Vλ) with λ > κ and consider
some formula φ in a two-sorted language holding in such a structure
relative to a certain finite collection of parameters. It is natural to posit
that there should exist a “set-sized” reflecting structure, containing all
the parameters, whose first component is Vα for some α < κ and whose
second component is “set-sized” in the sense of having cardinality less
than iκ and furthermore such that the transitive collapse of the sec-
ond component is of the form Vβ for some β > α. (Here the collapsing
map may not be injective.) A level Vκ satisfies this form of reflection if
and only if κ is supercompact. This form of reflection is quite closely
related to, but not quite as strong as, the form of reflection considered
in Marshall’s theory B0(V0) of the paper [14]. Indeed, we easily see
from the foregoing considerations that Marshall’s theory B0(V0) proves
that the height κ of the universe V0 is supercompact, and therefore by
further application of the reflection principle that V0 is a model for the
assertion that there is a proper class of supercompact cardinals. This
resolves affirmatively the question asked by Marshall about whether
B0(V0) is sufficiently strong to prove the existence of a supercompact
cardinal. On the other hand it would seem that her theory B1(V0)
does not prove the existence of a huge cardinal. For if κ is huge and
j : V ≺ M is an elementary embedding witnessing the hugeness of
κ, then it seems that (Vκ, Vj(κ), Vj(κ)+1) is a model for B1(V0) using
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the same reasoning which Marshall uses to prove that it is a model of
B0(V0), in the proof Theorem 3 of Chapter IV of [14].
Later in the paper [14] Marshall introduces the theories Bn(V
0
0 , V
1
0 , . . . V
m−1
0 ),
for positive integers m and n, as motivation for the existence of m-huge
cardinals. In the final section of her paper she goes even further up
to the point of inconsistency with the axiom of choice. I hope in later
work to elaborate on possible principled reasons, inspired by the lines of
thought put forward by Marshall, and assuming that one does indeed
regard the principles of Welch and Roberts as intrinsically justified,
for accepting all large cardinals not known to be inconsistent with the
axiom of choice, while still finding principled reasons for not going to
the point of inconsistency with choice.
4. Concluding remarks
Our exploration of the range of reflection principles which have been
proposed in the literature outline two possible conceptions of intrin-
sic justification, one which matches Peter Koellner’s conjecture that
intrinsic justifications do not take us to the point of an ω-Erdo˝s car-
dinal, and one which extends up to the reflection principles of Welch
and Roberts, and indeed, as suggested here, plausibly all the way up
to a supercompact cardinal. The remarks made here should serve as
a basis for further philosophical exploration of the question of which
large cardinals are intrinsically justified.
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